{
  "added_at": "2026-10-20",
  "arxiv_id": "2610.06258",
  "arxiv_version_reviewed": "v1",
  "authors": [
    "Ulysse Planta",
    "Julian Rederlechner",
    "Martin Strohmeier",
    "Mathias Fischer",
    "Ali Abbasi"
  ],
  "bibtex_url": "https://awesomerea.org/papers/citations/paper-satbleed.bib",
  "citation": {
    "container_title": "2026 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)",
    "pages": "2904-2921",
    "publisher": "IEEE",
    "sources": [
      "https://api.crossref.org/works/10.1109/SP63933.2026.00213"
    ]
  },
  "code_url": "https://github.com/EmsecCispa/SatBleed",
  "date_basis": "IEEE's Crossref publication date, corroborated by CISPA; October 5 is the later arXiv deposit.",
  "date_basis_zh": "采用 IEEE 提交至 Crossref、并由 CISPA 确认的出版日期；10 月 5 日是后续 arXiv 提交日期。",
  "date_precision": "day",
  "description_en": "Studies satellite communication modules through hardware inspection, firmware reverse engineering, protocol analysis, partial rehosting and targeted testing. A component-level threat model connects recovered data flows to security boundaries.",
  "description_zh": "通过硬件检查、固件逆向、协议分析、部分重托管及针对性测试研究卫星通信模块，以组件级威胁模型将恢复的数据流与安全边界联系起来。",
  "doi": "10.1109/SP63933.2026.00213",
  "entry_url": "https://awesomerea.org/papers/paper-satbleed/",
  "entry_url_zh": "https://awesomerea.org/zh/papers/paper-satbleed/",
  "evidence_urls": [
    "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.06258",
    "https://arxiv.org/html/2610.06258v1",
    "https://api.crossref.org/works/10.1109/SP63933.2026.00213",
    "https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2026/accepted-papers.html",
    "https://cispa.de/en/research/publications/213033-satbleed-security-of-commoditized-communication-modules-in-satellites",
    "https://github.com/EmsecCispa/SatBleed/blob/e4d70e45dd6527d1f1171ede2c44a7e09cd2ffed/README.md"
  ],
  "first_arxiv_date": "2026-10-05",
  "id": "paper-satbleed",
  "json_url": "https://awesomerea.org/papers/paper-satbleed/record.json",
  "kind": "research",
  "markdown_url": "https://awesomerea.org/papers/paper-satbleed/index.md",
  "markdown_url_zh": "https://awesomerea.org/zh/papers/paper-satbleed/index.md",
  "metadata_notes": "IEEE and CISPA establish May publication; the October arXiv v1 is the reviewed full text. The pinned supplement README describes a trimmed fuzzer without case-specific oracles and STIX bundles. Working exploit payloads and the inferred mission list are withheld. No repository-wide license was verified.",
  "metadata_notes_zh": "IEEE 与 CISPA 确认 5 月出版；本次读取 10 月提交的 arXiv v1 全文。固定补充材料 README 描述裁剪后的模糊测试器及 STIX 包，其中不含案例专用判定器；可运行利用载荷和推断的任务名单未发布。未核实仓库整体许可。",
  "pdf_url": "https://arxiv.org/pdf/2610.06258v1",
  "project_url": null,
  "publication_date": "2026-05-18",
  "publication_status": "conference-paper",
  "record_type": "paper",
  "runtime_tested": false,
  "scope_limitations_en": "Detailed assessment covers three vendors in isolated laboratory setups, not operational satellite links. The reported 28 of 64 active missions are passively inferred as plausibly vulnerable, not actively compromised; encrypted or compressed telemetry is excluded. Manual analysis cannot establish completeness, and vendor-specific findings do not generalize to all modules. LLM use was editorial, not an evaluated reversing agent.",
  "scope_limitations_zh": "详细评估针对三个厂商的隔离实验环境，并未接触在轨卫星链路。所报告的 64 个活跃任务中有 28 个可能受影响，来自被动推断而非实际入侵；加密或压缩遥测被排除。人工分析不能证明完整性，厂商特定结果也不能推广到全部模块。大语言模型仅用于编辑，并非接受评测的逆向智能体。",
  "targets": [
    "firmware",
    "protocol",
    "binary"
  ],
  "title": "SatBleed: Security of Commoditized Communication Modules in Satellites",
  "title_zh": "SatBleed：卫星商用通信模块的安全性",
  "url": "https://doi.org/10.1109/SP63933.2026.00213",
  "venue": "IEEE S&P 2026",
  "verification": "source-reviewed",
  "verified_at": "2026-10-20",
  "why_fits_en": "Documents firmware and undocumented-protocol recovery with explicit hardware and evidence constraints.",
  "why_fits_zh": "记录固件及未公开协议的恢复，并明确硬件与证据限制。",
  "year": 2026
}